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Posted Thursday, February 19, 2026:
Bockhold v. CIBC Wood Gundy,
2026 BCCA 74
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2026/01/30
Court of Appeal
The appellant challenges an order granting summary judgment in favour of the respondent in the respondent’s action to enforce a settlement agreement between the parties. The appellant raises two grounds of appeal: (1) the judge erred in granting summary judgment in the face of his counterclaim; and (2) the judge failed to consider his defence of duress. Held: appeal dismissed. It was open to the judge to conclude that the counterclaim did not stand in the way of summary judgment because the counterclaim raised the same issues as the response to civil claim with respect to enforceability of the settlement agreement and the other issues in the counterclaim were extricable. The judge did not err in failing to consider the defence of duress. This defence was not explicitly argued and was not available on the record before her.
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Posted Wednesday, February 18, 2026:
Clearview AI Inc. v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner),
2026 BCCA 67
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2026/02/18
Court of Appeal
This appeal arises from a judicial review of the British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner’s decision that the appellant, Clearview AI Inc., contravened the Protection of Information and Privacy Act by collecting facial data of British Columbians from social media websites without their consent to use in its facial recognition business. The Commissioner prohibited Clearview from offering its facial recognition services in BC and required it to make best efforts to stop collecting facial data of British Columbians without their consent and delete the facial data of British Columbians in its possession. Clearview argues that PIPA does not apply to it as a matter of constitutional law, PIPA does not require it to obtain individual consent, and the Commissioner’s order was overbroad, unnecessary, and unenforceable.
HELD: Appeal dismissed. PIPA is constitutionally applicable to Clearview because there is a real and substantial connection between its online activities and the province. It was reasonable for the Commissioner to conclude that PIPA does not exempt Clearview from obtaining individual consent because the information was not “publicly available”, and Clearview did not have reasonable purpose such that consent was statutorily implied. The Order is enforceable and was a reasonable exercise of remedial discretion.
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Jones v. Bottom,
2026 BCCA 73
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2026/01/22
Court of Appeal
The appellant applies to vary or set aside an order made in chambers dismissing his application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, appeal record, transcripts and factum, and dismissing the appeal as abandoned. He argues the justice made errors in fact in determining whether the first factor (bona fide intention to appeal) and third factor (undue prejudice) were satisfied. He further contends the judge made errors of mixed fact and law in determining the merits of his appeal were very low.
Held: Application dismissed. The justice applied the correct principles. The appellant was unable to show the justice was wrong in law or misapprehended the facts.
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Posted Tuesday, February 17, 2026:
Dhanesar v. Pandher,
2026 BCCA 63
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2026/02/17
Court of Appeal
The transaction for the sale of a newly constructed residential property did not proceed after the sellers (respondents) failed to provide the buyer (appellant) with an unconditional occupancy certificate or evidence satisfactory to the buyer that construction was finished as required under the sale agreement. The sellers sued the buyer for damages. The trial judge awarded damages, finding the buyer’s exercise of contractual discretion was unreasonable, unfair, and not exercised in good faith. The buyer appeals, alleging the judge erred in law in his approach to assessing the duty of good faith in the exercise of contractual discretion.
Held: Appeal allowed. The judge made two inter-related legal errors by articulating and applying the wrong legal principles to his interpretation of the contract and analysis of the duty of good faith. First, the judge erred by applying the duty of good faith in the exercise of contractual discretion as if it were a principle of contractual interpretation. The judge collapsed the two stages of analysis—contract interpretation and consideration of the duty of good faith—by relying on good faith to interpret the purpose and scope of the discretion under the clause at issue. Second, the judge erred in assuming the duty of good faith in this context favoured a standard of objective reasonableness. As the judge assessed the evidence according to the wrong legal framework, the factual findings cannot stand. A new trial is ordered.
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R. v. Farac,
2026 BCCA 64
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2026/02/17
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals a sentence of 774 days for firearms offences under the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and consecutive sentences of an additional 90 days for threatening offences, on the basis that the sentencing judge erred by (1) failing to address the significant collateral consequences of his loss of immigration appeal rights; (2) concluding that a conditional sentence was beyond the range of potential sentences for his offences; and (3) failing to apply the principle of totality in imposing sentence.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge sufficiently considered the collateral consequences but ultimately concluded that, due to the gravity of the offences, the appellant’s high moral culpability, and the limited information related to rehabilitation, she was unable to mitigate these consequences. The judge also did not err in concluding that a CSO was not appropriate due to the appellant’s moral blameworthiness and the gravity of the offences, or in not expressly considering totality when crafting a proportionate sentence.
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