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Posted Wednesday, April 15, 2026:
Heywood v. Songhees Nation,
2026 BCCA 150
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2026/04/15
Court of Appeal
The appellants were owners of homes in a manufactured home park located on the respondent Songhees Nation reserve land. Songhees Nation terminated the tenancies of residents in the park. The appellants’ claim against Songhees Nation for various relief, including a right to continue to occupy the site, was dismissed. The appellants appeal from the judge’s order requiring them to move the homes off the site and from the dismissal of their claim for damages based on unjust enrichment.
Held: Appeal allowed in part. The judge erred when she determined that the homes were chattels and therefore had to be moved by the appellants. The homes had become fixtures, and therefore the appellants are not required to move them. The judge did not err in dismissing the claim for damages based on unjust enrichment. Songhees Nation gave three years’ notice of the termination of the tenancy and permitted the appellants to remove their homes. It did not act unconscionably.
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Melbarde v. Carr,
2026 BCCA 162
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2026/04/08
Court of Appeal
The applicant seeks a determination that leave is not required in her appeal from an order (i) enforcing a consent order to sell the family home, and (ii) dismissing her application to vary that order. In the alternative, she seeks an order granting leave to appeal. Held: leave is required; application for leave dismissed. While an order for sale of a family home is not a limited appeal order, the issue before the judge below was whether the sale order should be enforced or varied. The sale order itself is not under appeal. The order under appeal was made to enforce the existing sale order and preserve the status quo. As such, it is an order granting and refusing interim relief under the Family Law Act, requiring leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 11(c). It is not in the interest of justice to grant leave to appeal in these circumstances. There is no merit in the proposed appeal and there is risk the appeal would delay the parties’ upcoming trial. In this high conflict matter, with minor children, retaining the trial date, and enabling this family to obtain final orders, is of utmost importance.
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R. v. Ali,
2026 BCCA 154
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2026/04/02
Court of Appeal
The appellant applies for leave to file a factum in excess of the 30-page limit set in the Court’s practice directive. Held: Leave granted. An extended factum is warranted given the length of the trial proceedings and the volume of the record on appeal. Considering the length and complexity of proceedings below, the arguments to be advanced on appeal, and the draft factum filed in support of this application, the appellant is granted leave to file a factum not exceeding 90 pages.
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Rasner v. Berger,
2026 BCCA 166
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2026/04/10
Court of Appeal
The applicant seeks leave to appeal an order that she is personally liable for costs in litigation she brought in her capacity as executor of an estate. She argues the judge erred in ordering costs against the applicant in her personal capacity in circumstances where the test for ordering costs against a non-party from Hollander v. Mooney, 2017 BCCA 238, was not met. Held: Application dismissed. Because the executor who commences a lawsuit in their capacity as executor is not a different legal person than the executor in their personal capacity, they are not a non-party in the latter capacity. It is settled law that a personal representative who brings an unsuccessful action on behalf of an estate may find themselves subject to an award of costs for which they are personally liable. The proposed appeal does not raise questions of principle that extend beyond the parameters of the specific case and does not meet the merits threshold for granting leave to appeal.
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Yurkiw Estate v. Yurkiw,
2026 BCCA 149
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2026/04/15
Court of Appeal
The respondents are the sole beneficiaries of a will. The appellant is the court appointed administrator of the will. The appellant challenges an order that affirmed its obligation to produce its file to the respondents. The appellant says the judge should have directed the respondents to identify particular categories of documents sought, and their objectives in seeking them, rather than making a blanket order for production. Held: Appeal allowed in part. The order excused the appellant from producing transitory records that had been deleted or made inaccessible only if it had set out in advance that it would not retain them. The requirement of advance notice to the beneficiaries should not have been included in the order. Otherwise, the judge did not err. When determining the extent of a trustee’s obligation to provide to a beneficiary documents in its possession, the proper approach is to choose the analytical framework best adapted to the trust and circumstances at hand. The judge did so, and there is no evidence of a palpable and overriding error. The judge’s award of costs was discretionary and does not reflect an error in principle or create a manifest injustice.
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Posted Tuesday, April 14, 2026:
Hong v. Yin,
2026 BCCA 161
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2026/03/20
Court of Appeal
The appeal concerns orders dismissing the appellants’ application for relief from forfeiture and directing certain funds to be paid to the respondent in partial satisfaction of a consent order. The judge dismissed the application for relief primarily because he held the remedy was not available to the appellants under the Law and Equity Act. The appellants submit the judge erred by adopting an unduly narrow approach to his interpretation of s. 25 of the Law and Equity Act. Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge made no error in concluding that relief from forfeiture was not an available remedy nor did he err in reaching his alternative discretionary determination that if relief from forfeiture was an available remedy, the appellants had not met their burden to establish a sufficient basis to grant that relief.
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R. v. Singh,
2026 BCCA 153
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2026/04/14
Court of Appeal
This is an application for the appointment of counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code. Held: Application dismissed. Although the appellant meets some of the criteria for an appointment, based on the material before the Court, there is no realistic prospect of success on the appeal from conviction. As such, it is not in the interests of justice to appoint counsel.
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Posted Monday, April 13, 2026:
Genesis Mortgage Investment Corp. v. Blais,
2026 BCCA 157
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2026/04/07
Court of Appeal
Genesis Mortgage Investment Corp. (“Genesis”) loaned the respondents $2,400,000 to finance the redevelopment of a property in Kelowna. This loan was secured by a mortgage against both the development property and the respondents’ family home. The respondents defaulted on the lean and Genesis commenced foreclosure proceedings. Pursuant to the order nisi, Genesis was awarded its costs on an indemnity basis. After the court-approved sale of the development property, the respondents requested an assessment of Genesis’s indemnity costs to ascertain the updated amount required to redeem the family home. Genesis claimed costs and disbursements in the amount of $104,067.39 but refused to waive privilege over its legal accounts while litigation was ongoing, preventing assessment of its claimed costs. An associate judge ordered Genesis to have its costs assessed. This decision was upheld on appeal to a Supreme Court judge. Genesis applies for leave to appeal to this Court and for a stay of the orders below pending determination of its appeal.
Held: Leave to appeal and stay granted.
This appeal raises the question of whether a lender awarded indemnity costs in a foreclosure can be compelled to have its costs assessed while litigation is ongoing. Either outcome of the proposed appeal could have significant consequences to parties in foreclosure proceedings. The proposed appeal is important to the parties, has some merit, and will not unduly hinder the underlying proceedings. It is in the interests of justice to stay the orders of the court below pending appeal. There is risk of irreparable harm if Genesis is forced to waive solicitor-client privilege before the determination of its appeal. The respondents do not stand to suffer significant prejudice if the stay is granted.
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Morton v. Cherkaoui,
2026 BCCA 156
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2026/03/16
Court of Appeal
The appellant and respondent started a wine importation company together. Several years into this venture, the respondent sought and was granted leave to bring a derivative action on behalf of the company against the appellant. The appellant appeals the chambers judge’s decision granting leave to bring the action. He argues that the judge erred: (1) in refusing his request for an adjournment, (2) in dismissing his application to remove the respondent’s counsel due to a conflict of interest, (3) in granting the respondent leave to commence the derivative action, and (4) in awarding solicitor-client costs in the cause of the derivative action. Held: Appeal dismissed. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any reviewable error in the judge’s decision.
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Posted Friday, April 10, 2026:
Perry v. General Motors of Canada,
2026 BCCA 147
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2026/04/10
Court of Appeal
This is an application for an order declaring the proceedings vexatious. Held: Application granted. The appellant has persistently and without reasonable cause commenced and continued vexatious proceedings. He has repeatedly failed to comply with timelines and has demonstrated an inability to focus on the real issues in dispute, instead making inflammatory and unsupported allegations of misconduct against the respondents and their counsel. The appellant is prohibited from commencing or continuing any future appeal relating to the within proceedings without leave of the Court or a Justice.
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R. v. Skiffington,
2026 BCCA 151
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2026/04/10
Court of Appeal
In an earlier decision, the appellant was granted leave to cross-examine witnesses in relation to a fresh evidence application. The Crown now applies pursuant to s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code for an order permitting two retired police officers to testify via videoconferencing. Held: Application granted for one police officer and dismissed for the other. In the circumstances presented, an order permitting videoconferencing is not appropriate where the impact of personal attendance is outweighed by prejudice to the appellant.
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Posted Thursday, April 9, 2026:
Northern Health Authority v. du Plessis,
2026 BCCA 143
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2026/04/09
Court of Appeal
The respondent was a pediatrician under service contract with the appellant health authority during the COVID-19 pandemic. The appellant terminated the 2021 service contract because the respondent did not receive a vaccination against COVID-19, contending the contract had been frustrated as the respondent was required to obtain a vaccination pursuant to an order by the Provincial Health Officer to continue to provide services. The respondent disputed the termination and commenced arbitration. In an initial award, the arbitrator found the NHA had breached the service contract by terminating the respondent. In a subsequent remedy award, the arbitrator found the respondent was entitled to damages for breach of contract and costs. The appellant filed an appeal from both awards, and the respondent filed an appeal from the remedy award. The appeals were agreed to be heard together, and both parties waived the other party’s requirement to seek leave to appeal under s. 59(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act.
Held: Appeal dismissed; cross-appeal dismissed.
On the appeal, the arbitrator’s assessment of the frustration defence, and the two elements at issue in the analysis were matters of mixed fact and law. Foreseeability as part of the frustration analysis was fact dependent, requiring the arbitrator to determine whether the parties might have reasonably contemplated the possibility of a vaccine mandate. Whether the health order was a supervening event making performance of the contract impossible also required consideration of the respondent’s contractual obligations and his unique factual circumstances. In addition, the interpretation of the health order cannot be separated from the frustration analysis as a question of law and was an integral part of the analysis. Even if viewed as an independent analysis, its interpretation is so inextricably linked to the evidentiary record that most questions raised by the NHA are questions of mixed fact and law reviewable on a deferential standard. To the extent that the NHA has identified a question of law, it is unable to demonstrate that the arbitrator erred in law in the interpretation of the health order.
On cross-appeal, the alleged questions of law arising from the remedy award are either questions of mixed fact and law or legal questions which do not arise out of the remedy award. The characterization of the dismissal is a finding of mixed fact and law and does not raise a legal question on the application of the common law presumption of reasonable notice. The question of repudiation was never raised to the arbitrator; it does not arise out of the remedy award. The respondent’s alleged question of legal construction of the contract and termination provision are attempts to reframe a central exercise of contractual interpretation of the termination provision, which was undertaken by the arbitrator, to seek a different outcome.
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Perry v. General Motors of Canada,
2026 BCCA 148
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2026/03/12
Court of Appeal
This is an application for leave to appeal an order requiring that the applicant post security for costs in the court below. If leave is granted, the applicant also seeks a stay of the order pending the hearing of the appeal, and the respondent seeks to have the applicant post security for costs in this Court. Held: Leave to appeal denied. It is not in the interests of justice to grant leave, particularly as the proposed grounds of appeal have very little merit. The two other related applications are accordingly also dismissed.
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Qi v. Liu,
2026 BCCA 146
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2026/04/09
Court of Appeal
The appellants appeal a finding that they are in contempt of an interim order made in an action arising from a dispute between the appellants, and their neighbours, the respondents. The respondents are the beneficiaries of an easement over and through the appellants’ property to the street. The easement guarantees “unobstructed access” to and from the respondents’ home and the street. By a chambers judge’s interim order, the appellants were prohibited from “obstructing” the easement. On appeal, the appellants allege that the chambers judge erred in finding them in contempt of this interim order because she erred in (1) her interpretation of the interim order: (a) by not interpreting it in a way most favourable to them given the ambiguity in the interim order (and in particular, whether “obstructing” means partial or total obstruction); (b) by referring to the easement to interpret it; and (2) by not exercising her residual discretion to decline to make a finding in contempt.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The chambers judge made no error in concluding that the interim order was clear and unequivocal in prohibiting both total and partial obstruction. Though the chambers judge erred in considering the easement in her interpretation of the order, it was immaterial, because the appellants could ascertain their precise obligations without reference to the easement. Finally, the chambers judge did not err in exercising her residual discretion because the appellants never asked her to do so.
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