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Posted Friday, May 1, 2026:
Jiang v. Peoples Trust Company,
2026 BCCA 185
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2026/05/01
Court of Appeal
The appellant applies for leave to appeal an order made in chambers by the case management judge in this certified consumer class action. The appellant applied to obtain financial documents held by extra-provincial and foreign non-parties, and to subpoena or depose representatives of those parties. The applications were brought pursuant to Rule 7 and s. 5 of the Subpoena (Interprovincial) Act. The chambers judge dismissed the application after determining the appellant was using Rule 7 deposition processes in aid of pre-trial examination and discovery of documents.
Held: (1) Leave to appeal is required. The authority for the orders was Part 7 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules. Letters of request are limited appeal orders. While it is within the inherent jurisdiction of the court to issue letters of request, that power is fully within Rule 7-8 and takes its procedural character from that Rule. Subpoenas issued via the SIA are not an independent authority for extra-provincial subpoenas. Their authority comes through the SCCR; and (2) The application for leave is dismissed. The appeal is not of significance to the practice or the action. While the grounds of appeal are not frivolous, they do not have high merit. Discretionary orders by a case management judge are owed considerable deference. The appeal would likely hinder the progress of the proceeding in the court below.
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Morton v. Cherkaoui,
2026 BCCA 179
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2026/05/01
Court of Appeal
These are supplementary reasons on costs. Held: Respondent is entitled to ordinary costs from the appellant. The appellant’s conduct on appeal does not meet the test for awarding special costs.
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R. v. S.C.W.,
2026 BCCA 180
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2026/05/01
Court of Appeal
As part of his sentence for sexual interference and making child pornography, the appellant is subject to a 20-year prohibition order under s. 161 of the Criminal Code. Upon completing his prison sentence and parole, the appellant applied under s. 161(3) to vary the conditions and duration of this prohibition order. His application was mostly unsuccessful. He now appeals and seeks to adduce fresh evidence regarding his current circumstances and risk of re-offending. Held: Leave to appeal is granted, but the appeal and application to adduce fresh evidence are dismissed. A court considering an application to vary under s. 161(3) has jurisdiction to revisit not only the conditions of the prohibition order, but also its duration, where the judge finds it “desirable” to do so based on circumstances that have changed since the order was imposed. The judge did not err in concluding that reducing the order’s duration was not “desirable” on the evidence before him. Nor did the judge err in declining to vary the conditions of the order to any greater extent than he did. As the judge did not commit any reviewable error in reaching his conclusion, the fresh evidence application is dismissed.
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Rehak v. MacDougall,
2026 BCCA 192
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2026/04/29
Court of Appeal
The appellant challenges the judge’s order pronouncing a will (executed by the deceased in 2016) in solemn form. The will left the estate to the deceased’s children, the residue to his former spouse, and nothing to the appellant, his spouse since 1994 (consistent with a prenuptial agreement). The appellant alleged suspicious circumstances and sought to rebut the presumption of validity.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge: (1) did not err by determining the issues summarily; (2) did not fail to assess, in accordance with the correct legal framework, the alleged suspicious circumstances; and (3) did not err when she rejected the evidence of the handwriting expert, preferring the evidence of two witnesses present at the time the will was signed.
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Salerno v. Sahota,
2026 BCCA 182
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2026/05/01
Court of Appeal
The appellant, Ms. Salerno, appeals from a jury’s award of damages on a negligence claim arising out of a motor vehicle accident. She alleges the judge erred (1) in failing to provide a limiting instruction concerning the use of a hearsay medical record, and (2) in suggesting a particular valuation method under the capital asset approach to loss of future earning capacity. Held: Appeal allowed, in part. (1) The judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that a hearsay opinion stating Ms. Salerno’s pre-existing medical issues were “consistent with” fibromyalgia could not be relied upon for the truth of its contents. However, this misdirection did not occasion any substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because the error, while legally significant, had no practical impact on the jury’s award. (2) The judge erred in law in instructing the jury that the capital asset approach to valuing loss of future income “usually involves” an award equal to one or more years of a plaintiff’s pre-collision income. There are a number of different methods for valuing loss under the capital asset approach, and the controlling jurisprudence does not suggest any “usual” or “preferred” method. The selection of the appropriate method for valuing the loss is a matter for the trier of fact to determine, based on an assessment of the factual matrix of the plaintiff’s claim as disclosed by the evidence. This error prejudiced Ms. Salerno’s position because her counsel urged the jury to adopt a different method for valuing the loss, and a properly instructed jury could reasonably have followed that approach to arrive at a different verdict on loss of future earning capacity. The jury’s award of $50,000 for loss of future earning capacity is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the court below for a judge-alone reconsideration of that particular head of damages. The jury award on all other heads of damage is undisturbed.
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Posted Wednesday, April 29, 2026:
R. v. Lekhraj,
2026 BCCA 175
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2026/04/29
Court of Appeal
The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and creation of child pornography. The trial concluded six weeks and two days past the 18-month presumptive ceiling for trials in provincial court. Eight months after conviction, the appellant applied for a stay of proceedings, contending his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached, contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter. That application was dismissed and the appellant was sentenced to three years and three months in custody. The appellant appeals, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) application and in engaging in impermissible propensity reasoning.
Held: Appeal allowed. The convictions must be set aside because the trial judge fell into prejudicial reasoning. The judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility, which was integral to the convictions, rested in part on evidence of the appellant’s character and his discreditable conduct unrelated to the offences charged. A new trial is therefore ordered. The trial judge did not err in dismissing the appellant’s s. 11(b) application. Delay beyond the presumptive ceiling was mitigated by a discrete event—the complainant’s inability to testify due to illness, which necessitated rescheduling the trial. Delay below the presumptive ceiling was not made out. The application was brought late in the proceedings, so the appellant could not demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the process.
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Posted Tuesday, April 28, 2026:
Leger v. Williams,
2026 BCCA 184
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2026/04/22
Court of Appeal
The Provincial Court ordered the appellant to return her young child to British Columbia, where the respondent father lives. The appellant obtained a stay of that order from the Provincial Court, pending her appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal was unsuccessful, and the appellant appealed to this Court. She sought a further stay in Provincial Court pending the outcome of this appeal, which was denied. She now applies for a stay in this Court. HELD: application dismissed. Section 234 of the Family Law Act limits this Court’s jurisdiction to grant a stay. The appellant should have appealed the Provincial Court’s denial of a further stay to the Supreme Court, as directed by s. 233.
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Moghari v. Dolatshah,
2026 BCCA 181
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2026/04/21
Court of Appeal
The respondent applies to dismiss the appeal as abandoned. Despite taking no steps to proceed with the appeal and not responding to the application, the appellants appeared to seek an extension of time. HELD: Application for dismissal granted. It is not in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time because the appellants did not have a bona fide intention to proceed with the appeal, the respondent was prejudiced by the delay, and the appeal had little merit.
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R. v. Chief Dsta’hyl,
2026 BCCA 176
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2026/04/28
Court of Appeal
The appellant was convicted of criminal contempt after breaching an injunction. At trial, he argued the court should excuse the breach by recognizing a novel excusatory common law defence of acting in accordance with Indigenous law. The trial judge concluded the proposed defence was an impermissible collateral attack on the injunction order. On appeal, the appellant argues the judge erred by failing to recognize the proposed defence on the basis it was a collateral attack. He further argued the judge erred in failing to admit oral history evidence adduced at trial.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The proposed defence fails in the present circumstances because disobeying the injunction was not a matter of last resort. There were other lawful and peaceful means available to the appellant to challenge the injunction. The judge did not err in concluding the proposed defence amounted to a collateral attack on the injunction order. No exception to collateral attack applies. In these circumstances, there is no reason to address the appellant’s oral history ground of appeal.
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R. v. Schirmer,
2026 BCCA 183
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2026/04/24
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals his 8-year sentence. The underlying conviction was his third in a series of indictments for drug trafficking offences. The appellant received credit for pre-sentence custody between August 2, 2017 and July 9, 2019 on his first conviction. That conviction was then quashed and the charges were stayed. The appellant says he should be given credit for the time he spent in custody between August 2 and the date he was sentenced for his second conviction. The Crown agrees. Held: Leave to appeal granted and appeal allowed. The sentence under appeal is varied by crediting the appellant for the 1,349 days he spent in custody prior to his sentencing on the second conviction at a rate of 1.5 to 1 for a total credit of 2,024 days.
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R. v. Singh,
2026 BCCA 174
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2026/04/28
Court of Appeal
The appellant was the complainant’s supervisor at a restaurant and challenges his conviction for sexual exploitation contrary to s. 153 of the Criminal Code. He submits that the trial judge erred in fact by misapprehending the evidence relating to his authority as a supervisor. He further submits that the judge erred in law by failing to apply the framework in R. v. W.(D.) to his evidence, by failing to consider whether he subjectively believed he held a position of authority, and by reversing the burden of proof. Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge did not misapprehend the evidence. Though the judge did not explicitly cite W.(D.), the judge correctly recognized that the Crown bore the burden of proof and considered whether the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was in a position of authority. The judge properly considered relevant objective and subjective factors when characterizing the parties’ relationship.
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Posted Monday, April 27, 2026:
R. v. Lyons,
2026 BCCA 178
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2026/04/15
Court of Appeal
The appellant challenges his conviction for sexual assault. He argues three grounds. He argues the trial judge erred by 1) failing to hold a voir dire before relying on evidence of other sexual activity and sexual disinterest; 2) by engaging in impermissible reasoning regarding his intentions; and 3) by relying on the complainant’s prior consistent statements. Held: Appeal allowed on the first ground. The respondent Crown concedes the appeal should be allowed and a new trial ordered because the trial judge erred by failing to hold a voir dire before allowing Crown counsel to adduce pre-incident text messages. The Crown does not seek to invoke the curative proviso at s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.
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