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Posted Wednesday, June 10, 2026:
A.T. v. D.C.,
2026 BCCA 250
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2026/06/10
Court of Appeal
This is an appeal from an order dismissing an application under the Protection of Public Participation Act, S.B.C. 2019, c. 3 (PPPA), that sought to dismiss a defamation action commenced by the respondent against the appellant. The alleged defamation was a posting on TikTok by the appellant stating that the respondent, her ex-boyfriend, was a “rapist”. The appellant asserts the chambers judge erred in his application of the test in s. 4(2) of the PPPA. The respondent says the judge applied the correct law and his assessment of the evidence in the record is entitled to deference.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The appellant’s submissions overstate the evidentiary standard the respondent must meet in an application to dismiss under s. 4 of the PPPA. The exercise is limited by the record before the judge and by the task at hand, which is a preliminary assessment that is not to delve into the ultimate merits of the claim or make significant credibility findings. The judge’s assessment was discretionary and there is no basis for appellate intervention.
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Alter v. The University of British Columbia,
2026 BCCA 253
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2026/06/10
Court of Appeal
The appellants appeal a chambers judge’s decision striking out their amended notice of civil claim (“ANOCC”) under R. 9-5(1) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules. The underlying dispute arose from the University of British Columbia’s (“UBC”) cancellation of a space-rental contract for an event the appellants planned to hold on campus. The ANOCC named as defendants both His Majesty the King in Right of British Columbia (the “Province”) and UBC. The appellants argue that it was necessary to name the Province as a defendant in order to recover Charter damages for breach of their Charter rights. On appeal, UBC conceded for the first time that the question of whether the Charter applied to it, and whether it could be liable for Charter damages, should go to a trial on the merits.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The chambers judge did not err in striking the claim against the Province. The chambers judge’s order is varied as necessary to reinstate the Charter claims against UBC, including those for Charter damages.
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Golden Spigot Pub Ltd. v. Eddy Ng Management Services Ltd.,
2026 BCCA 231
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2026/05/29
Court of Appeal
Mr. Ng and Mr. Wong incorporated Golden Spigot Pub Ltd. to acquire and manage the Six Mile Pub in Greater Victoria. The corporation was conceived, effectively, as a partnership between the two individuals. As a result of a disability (the nature of which is disputed), Mr. Ng largely stepped away from management of the company several years ago. After his death, his estate wished to monetize his shareholdings (which were held by his investment corporation) but was unsuccessful in soliciting a reasonable offer from the majority shareholders. The estate and the investment company brought a petition alleging oppression, and in the alternative, seeking to have the company liquidated on the basis that it was “just and equitable” to do so. The judge found no oppression but did make a liquidation order under s. 324 of the Business Corporations Act. The majority shareholders appealed the liquidation order and the petitioners cross appealed from the dismissal of the oppression claim. Held: Appeal allowed in part, cross appeal dismissed. The judge made no error in finding a remedy under s. 324 to be “just and equitable”. He also made no error in dismissing the oppression claim. The judge ought, however, to have fashioned a remedy less draconian than liquidation. The remedy is modified to allow the majority shareholders to purchase the shares at a fair valuation (or have them cause the company to redeem them). Only if they do not elect to do so should the company be liquidated.
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Zhang v. Deng,
2026 BCCA 252
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2026/06/10
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals from a post-trial order directing the sale of two real properties to effect a previously ordered equal division of family property. The appellant contends the judge did not have jurisdiction to grant the order for sale because a prior consent order contemplated a “swap” of the properties with each party retaining one of them. Held: Appeal dismissed. The consent order conditionally stayed a previous order for the sale of the properties. As the terms of the stay were not met, the judge had the inherent jurisdiction to lift the stay and resurrect the previous order for sale. He also had the jurisdiction, conferred by s. 97 of the Family Law Act, S.B.C., 2011, c. 25, to grant additional ancillary orders to give effect to the previously ordered equal division.
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Posted Tuesday, June 9, 2026:
Jonckeau v. British Columbia (Attorney General),
2026 BCCA 247
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2026/06/09
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals from an order striking his amended notice of civil claim on the basis that it was plain and obvious that the pleading disclosed no reasonable claim. The appellant brought a claim alleging that statutory provisions governing reimbursement for out-of-province medical care, as well as the actions and/or omissions of the respondents, unjustifiably infringed his rights under s. 7 of the Charter.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The impugned statutory provisions do not deprive the appellant of his rights to life, liberty or security of the person. Rather, they impose limits on when the government will provide funding for out-of-province medical care. The chambers judge correctly held that the Charter does not impose a positive obligation on the government to provide a financial benefit, except in special circumstances that were not pleaded in this case. It follows that the claims the appellant seeks to advance cannot succeed.
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McKinley v. McKinley,
2026 BCCA 260
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2026/06/01
Court of Appeal
The appellant husband appeals from the trial judge’s order dismissing his claim for equal division of family property acquired by the respondent spouse after separation. The appellant submits the judge erred by rejecting his assertion that the parties reconciled after they separated and divided family property in 2018. Held: Appeal dismissed. An appeal is not a re-trial and this Court treats with deference a trial judge’s findings of fact. Many of the appellant’s argument were made to, and rejected by, the trial judge. The trial judge disbelieved the appellant. The appellant has not demonstrated a reviewable error.
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Proust v. Proust,
2026 BCCA 246
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2026/06/09
Court of Appeal
The appellant husband and the respondent wife signed a separation agreement in December 2023 with an effective date of July 2023. The agreement provided that the husband would pay $18,500 in monthly spousal support and allowed the parties to apply to vary spousal support upon a material change in either of their financial circumstances. In the fall of 2023, the appellant notified the respondent of an anticipated decline in his 2024 income and later brought an application to reduce his spousal support payments, which the chambers judge dismissed. Held: Appeal allowed. The judge erred by failing to adequately account for the material change from the effective date of the agreement, rather than the date it was signed. Properly considered, the appellant’s significant drop in income should have amounted to a material change in this context.
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Wang v. Superintendent of Real Estate,
2026 BCCA 256
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2026/06/05
Court of Appeal
The appellants apply for an extension of time to appeal, and the respondent, Superintendent of Real Estate (the “Superintendent”), applies for the payment of security for costs. The appellants are a licensed real estate agent and her personal real estate corporation. The Superintendent is an appointed statutory decision-maker under the Real Estate Services Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 42 [RESA]. The underlying appeal arises from the Superintendent’s petition for judicial review of a decision setting aside an initial finding that the appellants had engaged in professional misconduct after a professional discipline proceeding.
Held: Application for an extension of time dismissed. Though the appellants demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal the reviewing judge’s order, the appeal lacks merit. As a result, it is not in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time. The Superintendent’s application is therefore moot.
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Wu v. Murray,
2026 BCCA 257
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2026/06/05
Court of Appeal
The applicant seeks to vary an order of a single justice dismissing her appeal as abandoned for failure to post security for costs. Held: Application dismissed. The applicant has not demonstrated any reversible error in the justice’s exercise of discretion.
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Posted Monday, June 8, 2026:
0998823 B.C. Ltd. v. Chitchot,
2026 BCCA 242
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2026/06/08
Court of Appeal
These appeals concern trial findings that a real estate developer breached its obligations to complete contracts of purchase and sale by not completing the transactions on what the judge found to be the completion date. In reaching that conclusion, the judge refused to imply a term that the completion occur within a reasonable time, failing which the contracts would terminate. Held: Appeal allowed. The judge made extricable legal errors in her interpretation of the contracts. She misapplied the “doctrine” of implied terms, failed to interpret the contracts in the relevant factual matrix, and relied on post contract conduct to interpret the contracts without having first found the contracts to be ambiguous.
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Posted Friday, June 5, 2026:
Bains v. Morishita,
2026 BCCA 241
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2026/05/22
Court of Appeal
An application to restore appeals from the inactive list was dismissed because they are wholly lacking in merit. The appeals are from orders striking the appellant’s claim against the respondent and refusing the appellant’s application for default judgment. The respondent is a judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia and the appellant’s claim was brought against him in respect of the respondent’s conduct while presiding over a matter in Supreme Court chambers. The appellant’s argument is that it is possible to distinguish the respondent’s conduct “as an individual who presided over a chambers hearing” from his conduct in his judicial capacity. It is not. The respondent is immune from suit in respect of conduct in his judicial capacity. The judge in the court below did not err in striking it and refusing default judgment.
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Electronic Arts Inc. v. Sutherland,
2026 BCCA 245
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2026/06/05
Court of Appeal
This appeal and cross-appeal arise from the certification of a class action relating to the sale of “loot boxes” in video games. The representative plaintiff, Mr. Sutherland, alleged that Electronic Arts Inc. and Electronic Arts (Canada) Inc. (together, “EA”) engaged in deceptive and unconscionable practices in breach of the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act [BPCPA], by selling loot boxes. In support of his claim of unconscionability, Mr. Sutherland also alleged that EA operated an illegal gaming scheme in breach of various provisions in the Criminal Code. The claim was certified as a class action in the court below with respect to the allegations of deceptive and unconscionable practices, but the certification judge struck the sections of the pleadings related to illegal gaming. EA appeals the certification and Mr. Sutherland cross-appeals the striking of the illegal gaming allegations.
Held: Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed. The certification judge did not err in determining that the pleadings disclose a cause of action for deceptive and unconscionable practices contrary to the BPCPA. EA has also not identified any palpable and overriding error of fact or an error in principle in the judge’s assessment of the other certification criteria. With respect to the cross-appeal, the certification judge did not err in striking the illegal gaming pleadings. The relationship between unconscionability and the alleged breaches of the Criminal Code is not direct enough for those breaches to be included in the pleadings as a legal basis for establishing unconscionability under the BPCPA.
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Okanagan Indian Band v. Parker Cove Properties Limited Partnership,
2026 BCCA 254
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2026/06/04
Court of Appeal
The appellant, the Okanagan Indian Band, applies for: (1) leave to appeal a British Columbia Supreme Court (“BCSC”) judge’s chambers order granting an interlocutory injunction; and (2) a stay of the judge’s costs order pending the proposed appeal.
Held: Application for leave to appeal dismissed. It is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal. The appellant has not met its significant onus of justifying why leave from an interim, discretionary order should be granted. The criteria for granting leave to appeal generally weigh against granting leave. The resources of the parties would be best put towards resolving the actual dispute between them.
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R. v. Gallagher,
2026 BCCA 196
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2026/04/27
Court of Appeal
The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering and committing arson to a pharmacy. The fire spread to the surrounding businesses, causing a total of $472,434 in damages. The appellant was sentenced to an aggregate custodial sentence of three years and nine months, followed by a three-year probation order. The sentencing judge also imposed a stand-alone restitution order, in favour of two insurance companies, which required the appellant to repay them for the amounts paid to their insureds. The judge found that the payment of the order was unlikely to ever be realized.
The Crown had not sought such an order, nor did the parties make submissions as to whether one should be imposed. The appellant only sought leave to appeal the restitution order and the Crown agreed that it should be set aside.
Held: Leave to appeal granted and the appeal is allowed. The judge made errors in principle by imposing the order without first considering the applicable legal framework or seeking submissions from the parties. In considering the matter afresh, the restitution order is set aside.
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R. v. Gallagher,
2026 BCCA 249
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2026/06/05
Court of Appeal
The sole issue on appeal was that the judge issued a restitution order without referring to or applying the relevant legal framework. After publication of the reasons for judgment, it came to the Court’s attention that both the appellant and the Crown’s submissions on appeal incorrectly stated that the Crown did not seek a restitution order at sentencing and the parties were not invited to make submissions on that issue by the judge. The division ordered a supplemental transcript to address this situation. From that transcript, it is clear that the Crown did seek a restitution order. Following very brief submissions by counsel, the judge made the order. These supplemental reasons address why an incomplete record was before this Court at the hearing of the appeal.
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