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Posted Wednesday, April 29, 2026:
R. v. Lekhraj,
2026 BCCA 175
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2026/04/29
Court of Appeal
The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and creation of child pornography. The trial concluded six weeks and two days past the 18-month presumptive ceiling for trials in provincial court. Eight months after conviction, the appellant applied for a stay of proceedings, contending his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached, contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter. That application was dismissed and the appellant was sentenced to three years and three months in custody. The appellant appeals, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) application and in engaging in impermissible propensity reasoning.
Held: Appeal allowed. The convictions must be set aside because the trial judge fell into prejudicial reasoning. The judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility, which was integral to the convictions, rested in part on evidence of the appellant’s character and his discreditable conduct unrelated to the offences charged. A new trial is therefore ordered. The trial judge did not err in dismissing the appellant’s s. 11(b) application. Delay beyond the presumptive ceiling was mitigated by a discrete event—the complainant’s inability to testify due to illness, which necessitated rescheduling the trial. Delay below the presumptive ceiling was not made out. The application was brought late in the proceedings, so the appellant could not demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the process.
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Posted Tuesday, April 28, 2026:
Leger v. Williams,
2026 BCCA 184
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2026/04/22
Court of Appeal
The Provincial Court ordered the appellant to return her young child to British Columbia, where the respondent father lives. The appellant obtained a stay of that order from the Provincial Court, pending her appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal was unsuccessful, and the appellant appealed to this Court. She sought a further stay in Provincial Court pending the outcome of this appeal, which was denied. She now applies for a stay in this Court. HELD: application dismissed. Section 234 of the Family Law Act limits this Court’s jurisdiction to grant a stay. The appellant should have appealed the Provincial Court’s denial of a further stay to the Supreme Court, as directed by s. 233.
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Moghari v. Dolatshah,
2026 BCCA 181
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2026/04/21
Court of Appeal
The respondent applies to dismiss the appeal as abandoned. Despite taking no steps to proceed with the appeal and not responding to the application, the appellants appeared to seek an extension of time. HELD: Application for dismissal granted. It is not in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time because the appellants did not have a bona fide intention to proceed with the appeal, the respondent was prejudiced by the delay, and the appeal had little merit.
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R. v. Chief Dsta’hyl,
2026 BCCA 176
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2026/04/28
Court of Appeal
The appellant was convicted of criminal contempt after breaching an injunction. At trial, he argued the court should excuse the breach by recognizing a novel excusatory common law defence of acting in accordance with Indigenous law. The trial judge concluded the proposed defence was an impermissible collateral attack on the injunction order. On appeal, the appellant argues the judge erred by failing to recognize the proposed defence on the basis it was a collateral attack. He further argued the judge erred in failing to admit oral history evidence adduced at trial.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The proposed defence fails in the present circumstances because disobeying the injunction was not a matter of last resort. There were other lawful and peaceful means available to the appellant to challenge the injunction. The judge did not err in concluding the proposed defence amounted to a collateral attack on the injunction order. No exception to collateral attack applies. In these circumstances, there is no reason to address the appellant’s oral history ground of appeal.
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R. v. Schirmer,
2026 BCCA 183
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2026/04/24
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals his 8-year sentence. The underlying conviction was his third in a series of indictments for drug trafficking offences. The appellant received credit for pre-sentence custody between August 2, 2017 and July 9, 2019 on his first conviction. That conviction was then quashed and the charges were stayed. The appellant says he should be given credit for the time he spent in custody between August 2 and the date he was sentenced for his second conviction. The Crown agrees. Held: Leave to appeal granted and appeal allowed. The sentence under appeal is varied by crediting the appellant for the 1,349 days he spent in custody prior to his sentencing on the second conviction at a rate of 1.5 to 1 for a total credit of 2,024 days.
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R. v. Singh,
2026 BCCA 174
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2026/04/28
Court of Appeal
The appellant was the complainant’s supervisor at a restaurant and challenges his conviction for sexual exploitation contrary to s. 153 of the Criminal Code. He submits that the trial judge erred in fact by misapprehending the evidence relating to his authority as a supervisor. He further submits that the judge erred in law by failing to apply the framework in R. v. W.(D.) to his evidence, by failing to consider whether he subjectively believed he held a position of authority, and by reversing the burden of proof. Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge did not misapprehend the evidence. Though the judge did not explicitly cite W.(D.), the judge correctly recognized that the Crown bore the burden of proof and considered whether the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was in a position of authority. The judge properly considered relevant objective and subjective factors when characterizing the parties’ relationship.
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Posted Monday, April 27, 2026:
R. v. Lyons,
2026 BCCA 178
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2026/04/15
Court of Appeal
The appellant challenges his conviction for sexual assault. He argues three grounds. He argues the trial judge erred by 1) failing to hold a voir dire before relying on evidence of other sexual activity and sexual disinterest; 2) by engaging in impermissible reasoning regarding his intentions; and 3) by relying on the complainant’s prior consistent statements. Held: Appeal allowed on the first ground. The respondent Crown concedes the appeal should be allowed and a new trial ordered because the trial judge erred by failing to hold a voir dire before allowing Crown counsel to adduce pre-incident text messages. The Crown does not seek to invoke the curative proviso at s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.
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Posted Friday, April 24, 2026:
Forrest v. Forrest,
2026 BCCA 171
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2026/04/24
Court of Appeal
The appellant challenges the trial judge’s determination of the family property in the parties’ home, his unequal reapportionment of it in the respondent’s favour, and his deduction of family debt from excluded property. She also takes issue with his order of spousal support and valuation of certain chattels. Held: Appeal allowed in part. The judge made errors of law in his determination of family property, reapportionment, and in deducting family debt from excluded property. He also erred in law in awarding retroactive spousal support and made a palpable and overriding error in valuing certain chattels. He made no reviewable error in determining the appellant’s income for spousal support purposes.
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R. v. Wareing,
2026 BCCA 160
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2026/04/17
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals their conviction for second-degree murder and attempted murder following a trial by judge and jury. The appellant contends the judge erred in their charge to the jury by failing to provide a no probative value instruction for certain pieces of after-the-fact evidence, and failing to instruct the jury that the order of gunshots was relevant to the appellant’s defence. Held: Appeal dismissed. The trial judge did not err in not providing a no probative value instruction for the appellant’s flight or failure to call 911 after-the-fact. The evidence had some probative value in relation to the question whether the appellant had acted in self-defence. When read as a whole, the charge reflected the appellant’s account of the events, and the judge properly instructed the jury on the use of this evidence. The trial judge also did not err in their charge on the sequence of shots, as it properly instructed the jury on the overlap of intent and commission of the act, and no further instruction was appropriate on the evidence.
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